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Abstract
We introduce a novel commodity tax mechanism in oligopolies that improves upon
the standard tax policies. The government (i) announces an excise tax rate τ and
(ii) auctions-off a number of tax exemptions. Namely, it invites the firms in a market
to acquire the right to be exempted from the excise tax. The highest bidders are
exempted paying the government their bids; and all other firms remain subject to
τ . Depending on the characteristics of the market, the mechanism we suggest has a
number of desirable features. First, it allows the government to collect more revenues
than the standard commodity tax policies (this is due to the competition among the
firms to acquire the exemptions). Second, for markets where firms have informational
advantage over the government, the mechanism allows for information revelation (via
the firms’ bids in the auction). Third, it impedes collusive activities in the market
(as the mechanism creates an artificial asymmetry among the firms, which hinders
collusion). Lastly, the mechanism is voluntary, namely the firms participate in the
auction only if they wish and hence they are free to choose how to be taxed.
Keywords: excise tax; tax exemption; auction; asymmetric information; collusion
JEL Classification: H25, L13.
1 Introduction
Is there a commodity tax policy that can address simultaneously the following important
issues: raise enough tax revenues; circumvent the informational disadvantage that the tax
authorities often have when imposing a tax policy; impede collusion among firms in a
market and, finally, be voluntary in the sense that the firms may choose the form of their
taxation. The goal of the current paper is to propose such a mechanism. The mechanism
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combines an excise tax policy with a tax-exemption auction: the government imposes an
excise tax rate τ that the firms in a market have to pay per unit of production, and also
announces the auctioning of a number of tax exemptions. Namely, it invites the firms to
bid in order to acquire, if they wish, the right to be excluded from paying τ . The firms that
place the highest bids win this right, pay the government their bids, and are not subject
to the excise tax. All other firms remain subject to it.
Via this mechanism, each firm in the market essentially has to decide whether to trans-
form a part of its marginal cost (i.e., the per unit tax) into a fixed cost (i.e., its bid in the
tax exemption auction). If it does so, it may obtain a cost-efficiency advantage over its
competitors in the product market. In this sense, the government acts as a patent holder,
which sells licenses to the use of a marginal cost-reducing ”innovation” (the innovation
being the avoidance of the per unit tax).
Depending on market characteristics, the suggested mechanism has the desirable fea-
tures mentioned in the beginning of the introduction. Namely:
(i) It can create more revenues for the government in comparison to the standard excise
tax policy.1 This is due to the competition among the firms to acquire the exemptions
and avoid competing with a marginal cost disadvantage. Among other things, this
implies that if the government wants to collect revenues of magnitude, say, R(τ), it
can do so by announcing a tax rate τ ′ < τ and by inviting the firms to bid for tax
exemptions. Such a lower tax rate creates lower distortions in the market. Moreover,
announcing low(er) tax rates is often more attractive from a political view point.
(ii) In markets where the government lacks information about the characteristics of the
firms, the tax-exemption auction can serve as an information eliciting mechanism:
the bids of the firms reveal, under certain conditions, their types to the government.
The latter fact can then be used by the tax authorities appropriately (e.g., to fight
tax evasion).
(iii) In markets where collusion and cartel formation is an issue, the mechanism can serve
as a cartel impeding device: depending on the number of tax exemptions auctioned-off
and the pre-auction profile of marginal costs, the mechanism may result on magnified
cost asymmetries among the firms, a fact which, in general, impedes cartels from
forming.
(iv) The above take place within a voluntary mechanism, namely the firms choose whether
to participate in the auction or not. This may address a potential criticism against
the mechanism: why bother with setting up an auction and not impose mandatory
lump-sum tax policies.
To fully capture the merits of the mechanism, which require competition among firms,
we introduce it for markets operating as oligopolies where firms’ interactions are most
prevalent. We choose the simplest possible such structure, a duopoly with homogeneous
1Notice that the extra revenues may suffice to finance any costs resulting from setting up the tax-
exemption auction.
2
goods.2 To boost competition for the exemption, we assume that the government auctions-
off a sole tax exemption. Our results, which are essentially spelled out above, can be
summarized as follows. We first analyze the mechanism under symmetric information,
where the government knows the characteristics of the firms. We show that if firms are
symmetric, the auction mechanism always generates higher tax revenues than the standard
excise tax policy, i.e., the policy where all firms pay the excise tax. When firms are (cost)
asymmetric, we show that: (i) the efficient firm wins the tax exemption in the auction; (ii)
the resulting tax revenues surpass the revenues from the standard excise tax policy provided
that the cost asymmetry is not very high. Under both cases of symmetry and asymmetry,
the mechanism enhances the welfare in the market vis-a-vis the excise tax policy.
We also examine the problem under asymmetric information, where the government
does not know with certainty the characteristics of the firms, and in particular, their cost
structure. As noted before, the auction now serves one more purpose: it may provide
information to the government. Indeed, we show that in an environment with symmetric
firms, the bids of the firms in the tax-exemption auction fully reveal their types to tax
authorities. This can then be used by the latter to prevent tax evasion: among other
things, true revelation of types implies that the firm that loses the auction will not be able
to under-report its demand. On top of fighting tax evasion, the government collects higher
expected revenues compared to the standard excise tax policy.
Finally, we test our mechanism in markets where the firms have the possibility to
collude. We consider an infinitely repeated market environment where the cartel, if it
forms, manipulates the market price. We derive two results. First, we show that the
mechanism is more effective in impeding the formation of the cartel (compared again to
the standard excise tax policy): the winner of the auction becomes more efficient than
the rival firm and, as a result, has a high incentive to violate a collusive agreement. This
implies that the cartel forms for lower ranges of the value of the discount factor (vis-a-vis
the standard excise tax policy). Second, the government’s revenues (weakly) surpass its
revenues under the excise tax policy.
The paper connects to the literature on commodity taxation in oligopoly. The roots of
this literature go back to the mid 80’s when economists started analyzing the design and
optimality of various tax policies outside the two antipodean cases of perfect competition
and monopoly.3 The main issues examined include tax incidence (Katz and Rozen 1985;
Seade 1985; Stern 1987; Hamilton 1999; Anderson et al. 2001); comparison between ad
valorem and excise taxes (Dierickx et al. 1988; Delipalla and Keen 1992; Skeath and Tran-
del 1994; Denicolo and Matteuzzi 2000); taxation in oligopolies under general equilibrium
(Myles 1989; Reinhorn 2005; Collie 2015); the optimal structure of excise and ad valorem
taxes when firms maximize their joint profits (Kay and Keen 1983); the sustainability of
collusion under ad valorem vs. excise taxation (Colombo and Labrecciosa 2013; Azacis
and Collie 2018), the sustainability of collusion in international duopolies (Haufler and
Schjelderup 2004); the comparison between ad valorem and excise taxation under uncer-
tainty and/or asymmetric information (Dickie and Trandel 1996; Goerke 2011; Goerke et
al. 2014; Kotsogiannis and Serfes 2014).
2We choose a duopoly structure as we want to introduce the mechanism in a simple framework. The
analysis can -in principle- be extended for the case of more than two firms.
3See Dierickx et al. (1988) for a review of the early literature on taxation and imperfect competition.
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Not all aspects related to taxation in oligopoly are, of course, examined in the current
paper. For example, the paper only focuses on excise and not on ad valorem taxation
(including both cases would require doubling the size of the paper). Further, the market
structure is fixed and simple, i.e., duopoly with homogeneous goods. So we don’t exam-
ine how entry in the market, product differentiation, etc., affect the performance of the
mechanism. Further, commodities in our model are not ”sin” goods, so a potential increase
in their consumption, due to our mechanism, is not a concern. Despite the restrictions
though, our framework provides, we believe, an adequate first step towards introducing the
tax mechanism and pointing out its merits.
Finally some comments on the ”applicability” or ”practicality” of the mechanism are in
order. First, our paper does not suggest that a tax-exemption auction mechanism should
be built for all markets (that fit our theoretical framework). This would be practically
impossible. What we suggest is that a government may choose a small number of markets,
that are well organized, with financially sound firms,4 etc, and therein run its auction(s).
Secondly, in order to highlight the relevance of the mechanism for the real world we
note that auctions are already used in a related policy issue in the field of international
trade: the auctioning of import licenses. Via this policy the government of the country that
imposes quotas on trade can uncover some of the rents associated with the restriction. The
mechanism has been used by countries like Australia, New Zealand, etc., (see Tan 2001)
and its success depends on the structure of product markets (see Krishna 1988, 1991, 1993;
Tan 2001). So, if an auction-backed government policy can work in international markets
then a related mechanism could perhaps work in the current paper’s context.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic ingredients of the mech-
anism and the market. Sections 3 analyzes the symmetric information case under one-shot
market competition. Section 4 analyzes the mechanism in a repeated market with collusion.
Section 5 introduces asymmetric information and the last section concludes.
2 Preliminaries
We consider a duopoly with firms 1 and 2. The quantity and price of firm i are denoted by
xi and pi, respectively, i = 1, 2. The marginal cost of i is constant at the level of ci; fixed
costs are set equal to zero. The firms produce a homogeneous commodity (differentiated
commodities can be easily incorporated in the analysis).
There is also a government which taxes the market. The tax mechanism consists of an
excise or per unit tax τ and a tax-exemption auction. Namely, the government announces
the tax rate τ that each firm pays per unit of production and also invites the firms to bid in
order to acquire the (unique) exemption from τ . If a firm acquires the exemption, it pays
the government its bid (we assume a first-price auction) and is exempted from τ , while its
rival remains subject to it. If no firm decides to participate in the auction, then both are
subject to τ .
The interaction evolves in time as follows:
(i) The government announces the excise tax rate and the rules of the tax-exemption
auction.
4Such elements are silently assumed to hold true in our paper.
4
(ii) The firms decide whether to participate or not in the auction; the auction takes place
(if any firm decides to participate); the winner is determined and pays the government
its bid.
(iii) The firms compete in the product market, given the outcome of the auction. Namely,
firm i operates with marginal cost ci, if it has acquired the exemption, or with ci + τ ,
otherwise.
3 One-shot market competition
We begin the analysis by focusing on the assumption that the firms compete in quantities
in one-shot fashion. We posit that an equilibrium always exists in the product market for
all values of τ . We denote by x1(τ, 0) and x2(τ, 0) the equilibrium quantities of the firms
when firm 1 only is subject to the per unit tax; and by x1(0, τ) and x2(0, τ) the equilibrium
quantities if firm 2 only is subject to the tax. Given our homogeneous-good environment,
there will be a common market price, p. The equilibrium price is denoted by p(τ, 0), if
firm 1 only pays the per unit tax, or p(0, τ), if firm 2 only pays it. Moreover, pi1(τ, 0) and
pi2(τ, 0) denote the equilibrium profits if firm 1 is subject to the per unit tax, and pi1(0, τ)
and pi2(0, τ) denote profits if firm 2 is subject to the tax. Finally, we denote equilibrium
quantities, price and profits under the standard excise policy, where both firms pay τ , by
xi(τ, τ), p(τ, τ) and pii(τ, τ), i = 1, 2.
Given the above, we can now focus on the auction. Consider first the case of identical
marginal costs, c1 = c2 = c (which means that firm i competes in the product market with
essential marginal cost c+ τ or c). Each firm will place a bid in the auction which is equal
to the difference between its profit when it is the sole firm exempted from the per unit tax
and its profit when its opponent only is exempted. In other words, the bids of firms 1 and
2 are
b1(τ) = pi1(0, τ)− pi1(τ, 0), b2(τ) = pi2(τ, 0)− pi2(0, τ) (1)
By symmetry of firms, the above bids are equal. Assuming firm, say, 1 is given the
exemption, the total revenues for the government are B(τ) = b1(τ) + τx2(0, τ).
On the other hand, under the standard tax policy, again with per unit tax rate τ , the
tax revenues are T (τ) = τx1(τ, τ) + τx2(τ, τ). We are interested in comparing the revenues
of the two policies for a fixed per unit tax rate.
Proposition 1 If c1 = c2 then B(τ) ≥ T (τ).
Proof We will assume that τ < p(0, τ) − c, which implies that the firm without the tax
exemption, namely firm 2, survives in the market.5
By the preceding analysis we need to show that
pi1(0, τ)− pi1(τ, 0) + τx2(0, τ) ≥ τx1(τ, τ) + τx2(τ, τ)
Using the ex ante symmetry between the firms, the above is equivalent to
5The opposite case, τ ≥ p(0, τ)−c, which would imply that firm 2 exits the market, could be considered
undesirable from a political view point. Nonetheless, we briefly discuss this case after the current proof.
5
(
p(0, τ)− c)(x1(0, τ)− x2(0, τ)) ≥ τ(x1(τ, τ) + x2(τ, τ)− 2x2(0, τ))
Using the upper bound on the tax rate, it suffices to show that(
p(0, τ)− c)(x1(0, τ)− x2(0, τ)) ≥ (p(0, τ)− c)(x1(τ, τ) + x2(τ, τ)− 2x2(0, τ))
or simply that x1(0, τ) + x2(0, τ) ≥ x1(τ, τ) + x2(τ, τ). But this inequality holds since
the l.h.s is total output when one firm only is charged the per unit tax, whereas the r.h.s.
is total output when both firms are charged the per unit tax.6
Let’s now see briefly the case τ ≥ p(0, τ) − c. Then pi2(0, τ) = 0 and also b1(τ) = pim,
where pim denotes the monopoly profit. Recalling that under constant returns the maximum
industry profit is attained when the market is a monopoly, our mechanism then gives the
upper bound for the revenues of the government.
Remark 1 We note that the two firms end up with the same net equilibrium profits. These
net profits are pi1(0, τ)− b1(τ) = pi1(τ, 0) for firm 1 and pi2(0, τ) for firm 2, where pi1(τ, 0) =
pi2(0, τ). So although only one firm is tax-exempted, the mechanism does not create ex
post (i.e., after tax) asymmetries.
We now move to the case of cost-asymmetric firms where, say, c1 < c2. The first
question that arises is whether the efficient or inefficient firm wins the auction. To address
this, notice that the maximum amount firm 1 is willing to bid in the auction is bmax1 (τ) =
pi1(0, τ)−pi1(τ, 0); likewise the maximum amount for firm 2 is bmax2 (τ) = pi2(τ, 0)−pi2(0, τ).
The firm with the highest such amount will win the auction by biding the other firm’s
maximum amount.
Lemma 1 Assume that c1 < c2. Then firm 1 wins the auction biding b
max
2 (τ).
Proof We need to show that bmax1 (τ) ≥ bmax2 (τ). This holds iff pi1(0, τ) + pi2(0, τ) ≥
pi1(τ, 0) +pi2(τ, 0). The l.h.s of this inequality is industry profit at the marginal cost profile
(c1, c2 + τ) and the r.h.s is industry profit at the marginal cost profile (c1 + τ, c2). The
former profile has higher variance than the latter (this holds as c1 < c2). Then we can
use Proposition 1 of Van Long and Soubeyran (2001) that industry profit (at a Cournot
equilibrium where all firms are active) is an increasing function of the variance of individual
marginal costs.
The second task is to compare the revenues under the policies of tax exemption and
excise tax. To facilitate the comparison we restrict attention to a linear inverse demand
function, p = a−X, where X = x1 + x2.
Remark 2 We assume that c2 < (a + c1)/2 which guarantees that, in the absence of any
government policy, the less efficient firm is active in the market.
As in the symmetric case, we will assume that the tax rate is such that the firm that loses
the auction remains active in the market. For the linear demand case this requires that
6This inequality holds under all ”regular” comparative statics results in Cournot competition.
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τ < (a− 2c2 + c1)/2.7
Proposition 2 Assume that p = a−X. The following hold:
(i) If c2 ≤ (a+ 7c1)/8 then B(τ) ≥ T (τ).
(ii) If c2 ≥ (a+ 4c1)/5 then T (τ) ≥ B(τ).
(iii) If (a + 7c1)/8 < c2 < (a + 4c1)/5 then B(τ) ≥ T (τ) for τ ≤ a + 4c1 − 5c2; and
B(τ) < T (τ) for a+ 4c1 − 5c2 < τ .
Proof Appears in the Appendix.
If c2 is sufficiently small (but always higher than c1) then we are ”close” to the symmetric
case, so the result of Proposition 1 is essentially repeated. On the other hand, if c2 is
large enough, namely if the cost disadvantage of firm 2 is large, then firm 1 outbids firm 2
relatively easy. As a result, the government collects relatively low revenues from the auction
and the standard policy outperforms it. For these two polar cases, the role of c2 is dominant,
so the tax rate plays no role in the comparison of the policies. Naturally, for intermediate
values of c2 other factors, such us τ , come into place. Essentially Proposition 2 (iii) repeats
parts (i) and (ii) by saying that the auction mechanism (the standard policy) generates
more revenue than the standard policy (the auction mechanism) if cost asymmetry adjusted
by τ is low (high). This we can see by re-writing τ S a + 4c1 − 5c2 (which combines the
two inequalities in the statement of Proposition 2 (iii)) as τ + 5c2 S a+ 4c1.
Remark 3 It is straightforward to show that under either cost symmetry (c1 = c2) or asym-
metry (c1 6= c2), social welfare in the market is higher under the tax-exemption mechanism
than under the standard excise tax policy.
4 Collusion
In this section we demonstrate another desirable feature of our mechanism: the impediment
of collusive activities in the market. As we will show, this occurs without any reduction in
the revenues of the government (compared to the standard excise tax policy). To elaborate,
assume that the two firms compete in the market for an infinite number of periods. The
firms are symmetric (c1 = c2 = c) and try to collude by selecting the market price and by
allocating the consumers between them.8 For simplicity, this allocation splits the market
equally between the two firms. We note that we don’t allow for side payments between the
two firms.
In every period each firm has to pay a tax τ per unit of its production. The government
auctions-off an exclusive tax exemption in the beginning of the first period. The winner of
the auction, which we will assume to be firm 1, pays the government its bid in every period
and is not subject to τ ; and firm 2 remains subject to τ , in every period too.
7Imposing this bound on τ further guarantees, in conjunction with Remark 2, that the thresholds
presented in Proposition 2, and their relations, are well-defined.
8The analysis goes through if we assume that firms collude in quantities. See the discussion after
Proposition 3.
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Denote by pm(0, τ) the collusive price when firm 2 only pays the per-unit tax and by
pimi (0, τ) the corresponding collusive profit of firm i. Denote by pi
d
i (0, τ) the profit of firm
i if i breaks the agreement, and by pibi (0, τ) its profit in the punishment phase. Finally let
b1(τ) be the winning bid of firm 1 (we will return to this later on).
Consider firm 1. Notice that pim1 (0, τ) = (p
m(0, τ) − c)X(pm(0,τ))
2
, where, with a slight
abuse of notation, X(pm(0, τ)) denotes industry output at price9 pm(0, τ). If 1 breaks the
agreement, it charges a price slightly below the collusive price, takes all market demand
(as goods are homogeneous), and has a profit which is approximately equal to pid1(0, τ) =
(pm(0, τ)− c)X(pm(0, τ)). Finally, the price of firm 1 at the punishment stage is p1(0, τ) =
c+ τ and hence pib1(0, τ) = (c+ τ − c)X(c+ τ) = τX(c+ τ). Firm 1 sticks to the collusive
agreement as long as10 pim1 (0, τ) ≥ (1− δ)pid1(0, τ) + δpib1(0, τ) or as long as
δ ≥ pi
d
1(0, τ)− pim1 (0, τ)
pid1(0, τ)− pib1(0, τ)
=
pim1 (0, τ)
2pim1 (0, τ)− pib1(0, τ)
= δ1(0, τ)
Consider now firm 2. Using a reasoning similar to the above, we have pim2 (0, τ) =
(pm(0, τ)− c− τ)X(pm(0,τ))
2
, pid2(0, τ) = (p
m(0, τ)− c− τ)X(pm(0, τ)) and pib2(0, τ) = 0. Firm
2 does not deviate from the collusive agreement as along as pim2 (0, τ) ≥ (1 − δ)pid2(0, τ) +
δpib2(0, τ) or
δ ≥ pi
d
2(0, τ)− pim2 (0, τ)
pid2(0, τ)− pib2(0, τ)
=
1
2
= δ2(0, τ)
Notice that δ1(0, τ) > δ2(0, τ), namely the winner of the auction has lower incentive to
join the cartel. This is because it is less hurt by a possible retaliation than its rival.
The above ex post asymmetry disappears under the standard per unit tax policy, as in
this case the punishment payoffs are zero for both firms. Namely, denoting this payoff by
pibi (τ, τ) for firm i, we have pi
b
1(τ, τ) = pi
b
2(τ, τ) = 0. Let p
m(τ, τ) be the collusive price under
the excise tax policy and pimi (τ, τ) and pi
d
i (τ, τ) the collusive and deviation profits of i. Then
pimi (τ, τ) = (p
m(τ, τ) − c − τ)X(pm(τ, τ))/2 and pidi (τ, τ) = (pm(τ, τ) − c − τ)X(pm(τ, τ)).
Then firm, say, 1 does not deviate from the agreement as long as
δ ≥ pi
d
1(τ, τ)− pim1 (τ, τ)
pid1(τ, τ)− pib1(τ, τ)
=
1
2
= δ1(τ, τ) = δ2(τ, τ)
It is easy to see that δ1(0, τ) > δ1(τ, τ); moreover δ2(0, τ) = δ2(τ, τ). So we conclude
the following.
Lemma 2 Cartel formation occurs less often under the tax-exemption auction mechanism
than under the standard excise tax policy.
Finally we will compare the revenues of the government under the two policies as a
function of the discount factor δ and of τ . To do so, we first need to go back to the
tax exemption auction. Recall that firm 1 wins the auction. The value of the winning
9Similar notation is used for industry output at any other price.
10The winning bid does not play a role in the decision of firm 1 to collude, so we don’t include it in the
analysis for the time being.
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bid depends on whether collusion or not occurs afterwards in the market. In particular,
b1(τ) = pi1(0, τ) − pi1(τ, 0) under no collusion; and b1(τ) = pim1 (0, τ) − pim1 (τ, 0) under
collusion. In the former case, B(τ) = b1(τ) and in the latter, B(τ) = b1(τ)+τX(p
m(0, τ))/2.
On the other hand, tax revenues under the standard policy are T (τ) = τX(c + τ) under
no collusion; and T (τ) = τX(pm(τ, τ)) under collusion.
The comparison of B(τ) and T (τ) will use the following mild assumption:
A1 The collusive price is a weakly increasing function of the marginal cost of each firm.
Proposition 3 Assume A1 holds. Then B(τ) ≥ T (τ) for all δ.
Proof Let first δ < 1/2. Then the cartel does not form under either of the policies. Under
the tax exemption policy one firm will operate with marginal cost c and its rival with c+τ .
Hence, the market price that will result from the ensuing price competition is c+ τ . Going
back to the auction, b1(τ) = pi1(0, τ) − pi1(τ, 0) = (c + τ − c)X(c + τ) − 0 = τX(c + τ) =
B(τ). Under the standard per unit tax policy, both firms operate with marginal cost
c + τ , which will be the market price. Hence the government collects, as we said before,
T (τ) = τx1(τ, τ) + τx2(τ, τ) = τX(c+ τ). We conclude that the two policies are equivalent
for this range of δ.
Let next 1/2 < δ < δ1(0, τ). For this range the cartel forms under the standard tax
policy only. Hence T (τ) = τX(pm(τ, τ)) and B(τ) = τX(c + τ), where the latter is
derived in the previous paragraph. But pm(τ, τ) ≥ pm(0, τ), by A1. Moreover, notice that
pm(0, τ) > c + τ . Thus X(c + τ) ≥ X(pm(τ, τ)) and B(τ) ≥ T (τ.) Let finally δ > δ1(0, τ).
In this range the cartel forms under both tax policies. Under the auction mechanism we
have B(τ) = pim1 (0, τ)−pim1 (τ, 0)+ τX(pm(0, τ))/2 = τX(pm(0, τ)) ≥ τX(pm(τ, τ)) = T (τ),
where the inequality uses again A1.
We have assumed that collusive activities are based on price competition. We note that
we would reach to similar conclusions (from a qualitative view point) in an environment
of quantity competition. For example, using a quantity competition model with linear
demand and quadratic costs we can show that: (i) the winner of the auction has higher
incentive to deviate from a collusive agreement than the opponent; (ii) the critical discount
factor for the formation of the cartel is an increasing function of the excise tax parameter;
(iii) the government collects higher revenues under the suggested mechanism for all values
of δ.
Furthermore we note that, as in previous cases, the net profits of the two firms are
equal. This might address a potential criticism: why implement an auction mechanism
and not simply charge the firms two different excise tax rates, τ1 and τ2 and still impede
the formation of the cartel (as asymmetry would again arise). In such a case, the two firms
would ex post be treated asymmetrically in the sense that they would end up with different
net profits. To the extent that this is undesirable, the government would then need to
compensate the firm that pays the higher excise rate, which makes the whole mechanism
cumbersome.11 Furthermore, such a policy loses the voluntary property of the auction
mechanism.
Notice also that a possible reaction of the firms against the mechanism is that they col-
lude not only in the product market, but also over not participating in the tax exemption
11Notice also that due to the compensation, the net revenues of the government might not be as high.
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auction. A deviation from the collusive agreement would then mean that the deviant firm
participates in the auction and wins the exemption. This might strengthen the sustain-
ability of the cartel. Anticipating this, the government could announce a sufficiently high
rate τ so as to make a deviation more attractive (breaking the agreement by participating
in the auction is more tempting under a relatively high τ).
5 Asymmetric information
We will now analyze the last feature of the mechanism, its ability to convey information to
tax authorities. We will analyze a market with symmetric firms in which the government
does not have complete information about the characteristics of the firms. In particular,
it does not know the exact value of the marginal cost of production; it knows though that
the firms are symmetric. There are a couple of ways to justify this information structure.
For example, it might be that the two firms face the same input supplier who provides a
homogeneous input to them (at a uniform price), and this is known to the government.
Still the government does not know the actual value of the input price. We assume that
the government believes that the cost of each firm is cL with probability q and cH with
probability 1 − q, where cL < cH . We let q be the prior probability attached to the event
that the two firms have marginal cost cL and 1 − q the probability attached to the event
that they have marginal cost cH .
The government again auctions-off a single exemption from τ . As in the previous
sections, the government commits to the value of τ before it observes the bids. Then, one
means via which the government benefits from a potential information revelation is that a
low-cost firm cannot be perceived as being high-cost and be taxed for a smaller quantity.12
We will return to this in Remark 4 below.
We will analyze the mechanism under a quantity competition framework (the analysis
could be easily extended to the price competition case as well). We begin by introducing
some notation. Let k ∈ {L,H}. Denote by xki (τ, 0) the equilibrium quantity of firm i when
firms are of cost ck and firm 1 only is subject to the per unit tax; and by xki (0, τ) the
corresponding equilibrium quantity of i if firm 2 only is subject to the tax. Equilibrium
profits will be denoted in a similar fashion. Namely, piki (τ, 0) denotes the profit of firm i if
firm 1 is subject to the per unit tax, piki (0, τ) denotes the profit of firm i if firm 2 is subject
to the tax, and so on. Finally let bk(τ) = pik1(0, τ)− pik1(τ, 0) = pik2(τ, 0)− pik2(0, τ).
We will assume the following.
A2 bL(τ) > bH(τ), for any τ .
Assumption A2 will hold throughout the section and we won’t refer to it again (it is
easy to show that A2 holds when the demand is, for example, linear). A uniform ranking of
bL(τ) and bH(τ), namely a ranking that holds for all τ , simplifies considerably the number
of steps that we have to check in order to find an equilibrium in the auction under the
current section’s information framework.
The first observation states that any bid above bH(τ) is a weakly dominated action for a
12Committing to the value of τ is by no means a necessary action. However, the merits of our mechanism
can be identified even under this assumption.
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high-cost firm. For this observation we do not need to assume that the government knows
that the firms are symmetric.
Lemma 3 b˜ > bH(τ) is weakly dominated by bH(τ) for a high-cost firm.
Proof Take the high-cost type of, say, firm 1. If 1 wins the auction with bid b˜, its net
profit is piH1 (0, τ) − b˜ < piH1 (τ, 0). If it loses, its net profit is piH1 (τ, 0), if it is perceived
as a high-cost firm, or piH1 (τ, 0) − τ(xL1 (τ, 0) − xH1 (τ, 0)), if it is perceived as a low-cost
firm. Let now firm 1 deviate from b˜ to bH(τ). If it wins the auction, its net profit is
piH1 (0, τ) − bH(τ) = piH1 (τ, 0). If it loses, its net profit is as in the case of bidding b˜. We
conclude that b˜ is weakly dominated by bH(τ).
In what follows we will assume that players do not use weakly dominated actions. Given
this, Lemma 3, although a straightforward observation, will play an important role in the
sequel. If the government ever observes a bid above bH(τ) it must conclude that this bid
comes from a low-cost firm. But since the government knows that firms are symmetric, it
will further deduce that both firms are low-cost firms. On the other hand, if the government
observes two bids less than or equal to bH(τ), it will deduce that the firms are of high cost.
Indeed the competition of the low cost firms will result in bids above13 bH(τ) (the high cost
firms cannot do so).
Denote by µ(cL|(b1, b2)) the posterior probability that the government assigns to the
event that the two firms are of low cost given that it observes bids (b1, b2); µ(c
H |(b1, b2))
is defined in a similar way. Given the above, consider the following posterior beliefs of the
governments:
(a) µ(cL|(b1, b2)) = 1, if bi > bH(τ), for at least one i.
(b) µ(cH |(b1, b2)) = 1, if bi ≤ bH(τ), for i = 1, 2.
Proposition 4 The following constitute an equilibrium in the tax-exemption auction:
(i) Each low-cost firm bids bL(τ); and each high-cost firm bids bH(τ).
(ii) µ(cL|(bL(τ), bL(τ))) = 1, µ(cH |(bH(τ), bH(τ))) = 1.
(iii) Beliefs off-equilibrium: see (a) and (b).
Proof Take the low-cost type of, say, firm 1. If it sticks to bL(τ), its bid is equal to that
of firm 2. So it is either given the exemption and thus have a net profit piL1 (0, τ)− bL(τ) =
piL1 (τ, 0) or it is not, in which case it pays the per unit tax and have profit again equal to
piL1 (τ, 0). Notice that in the latter case it will be perceived as a low-cost firm (given the
posterior beliefs of the government).14
If the low-cost type of firm deviates to b˜ > bL(τ) it will win the auction but with net
payoff piL1 (0, τ) − b˜ < piL1 (τ, 0). If it deviates to b˜ < bL(τ) it will lose the auction, without
13This can be easily shown.
14If it was perceived as a high-cost firm its profit -in the event of not receiving the exemption- would be
piL1 (τ, 0) + τ(x
L
1 (τ, 0)− xH1 (τ, 0)).
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changing the beliefs of the government (since the other firm sticks to its bid). Hence its
net profit in the latter case will be piL1 (τ, 0). So a low-cost firm does not deviate.
Take now the high-cost type, again of firm 1. If it sticks to bH(τ) it is again either given
the exemption and thus have a net profit piH1 (0, τ)− bH(τ) = piH1 (τ, 0) or it is not, in which
case it pays the per unit tax and have profit piH1 (τ, 0). If it deviates to b˜ > b
H(τ), it will
win the auction with net payoff piH1 (0, τ)− b˜ < piH1 (τ, 0) (see also Lemma 3). If it deviates
to b˜ < bH(τ) it will lose the auction, without again changing the beliefs of the government.
Hence its net profit will be piH1 (τ, 0). So a high-cost firm does not deviate too. Finally, the
beliefs of the government stated above are consistent with the equilibrium actions of the
firms.
Remark 4 Since the bids of the firms reveal their types, the low-cost type of the firm that
loses the auction cannot claim that is of high-cost so as to be taxed for a smaller quantity.
In this sense the mechanism has a tax-evasion avoidance property (which was mentioned
before in the paper).15
Consider now the standard per-unit tax policy where both firms pay τ. The expected rev-
enues for the government are q[τ(xL1 (τ, τ) + x
L
2 (τ, τ))] + (1 − q)[τ(xH1 (τ, τ) + xH2 (τ, τ))].
Proposition 1 has already shown that for each c, the revenues under our mechanism are
higher than the revenues under the standard per unit tax policy. Combining this with
Proposition 4 we conclude that the mechanism generates higher revenue also under asym-
metric information.
Proposition 5 Under the outcome described in Proposition 4, the government achieves
higher expected revenues compared to the standard excise tax policy.
We note that, given the beliefs of the government specified above, there could be no other
equilibrium bids. Of course, introducing other (less plausible) beliefs can result into other
outcomes. For example, if the government believes that a low bid of, say, firm 1 means 1
is of cH type irrespective of the bid of the other firm, then the cL type of firm 1 will have
incentive to deviate from bL(τ) so as to lose the auction, be perceived as high-cost, and
have net payoff16 piL1 (τ, 0) + τ(x
L
1 (τ, 0) − xH1 (τ, 0)) > piL1 (τ, 0). However, we exclude this
kind of beliefs on behalf of the government.
6 Conclusions
This paper has introduced a novel tax mechanism in oligopoly. Essentially, the suggested
mechanism works complementarily to the existing commodity tax policies in several aspects
(namely, in revenue-raising, in resolving issues of asymmetry of information and in the
impediment of collusive activities). One of the merits of the mechanism is that it is not
mandatory: each firm may choose how to be taxed. In this sense, the mechanism improves
also upon the policy of mandatory lump-sum taxes on firms’ profits.
15Clearly, the mechanism’s merits increase if we allow the government to optimize over τ after observing
the bids of the firms.
16The inequality holds as, clearly, xL1 (τ, 0) > x
H
1 (τ, 0).
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One can think of a number of potential extensions of the current work (see also the
discussion in the Introduction). The analysis of the mechanism under an ad valorem tax
policy seems to be of immediate interest. Allowing for more than two firms in the market
and endogenizing the number of tax exemptions that the government auctions-off, may
shield more light on how far the mechanism can go in real markets. Further, allowing for
transferable exemptions, in the sense that the winner of the auction is free to to sell, if it
wishes, the tax exemption to his rivals is also worth to be examined. Finally, relaxing the
assumption that the firms know each others’ marginal cost in section 5 could enhance the
significance of that part of analysis.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2 We have T (τ) = τ(a−2c1+c2−τ
3
+a−2c2+c1−τ
3
) andB(τ) = τ 2a−4c2+2c1−τ
3
+
τ a−2c2−+c1−2τ
3
. It is easy to show that B(τ) > T (τ) iff a+ 4c1− 5c2− τ > 0. We notice that
if cmax2 > c2 > (a+4c1)/5 ≡ c′2 then B(τ) < T (τ) for all τ . And if c2 < c′2 then B(τ) > T (τ)
iff τ < a + 4c1 − 5c2. We conclude the proof noting a + 4c1 − 5c2 > (a − 2c2 + c1)/2 iff
c2 < (a+ 7c1)/8.
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